colonialism

military organisations existed in pre-colonial societies in Uganda, the establishment of a standing army in modern Uganda dates back to the 1890s and the beginning of colonial rule. There were three stages in the formation of the army at that time. First, a body of soldiers was formed under the aegis of the Imperial British East Mrica Company (IBEA Co.) to assist in realising the Company's commercial objectives in the country. This initially consisted of Swahili askari (guards) who accompanied Lugard from the coast. In 1891 they were augmented with Sudanese troops enlisted by Lugard from the remnants of Emin Pasha's army. Secondly, after the departure of the IBEA Co. and before Uganda was formally incorporated into the British sphere of influence, the provisional administration recruited Baganda to back up Sudanese and Swahili troops in the military expedition against Kabarega in 1893-4. This was, however, a temporary arrangement. Thirdly, when Uganda became technically a British Protectorate, the authorities established a standing army in order to continue the task of'pacifying' the people and to back up the administration. In 1897 a mutiny of some of the administration's Sudanese troops posed a serious threat to the British occupation of the country. The mutiny was eventually brought to an end with the assistance of troops drafted from India and the East Mrican coast. When the administration's authority was re-established in Uganda, the policy of deploying troops away from their area of origin, already in practice, began to be more rigorously pursued. This was the stage reached in the historical development of the Uganda military by the turn of the twentieth century. The modern history ofUganda owes much to European expansion overseas in the second half of the nineteenth century. This expansion represented imperialism of a new type. The old imperialism was by and large confined to military conquest and plunder, in the name of 'civilisation' - whether Greek, Roman or Chinese. The new imperialism was more complex and had a far more pervasive impact than the old. The new imperialism created a new mode of relations between the conquering and conquered peoples, in which new social, political and economic structures were brought into existence within the conquered territories. Thus, the colonising and the colonised were drawn into a new network of global economic relations. Uganda's importance in this new process derived from her strategic position in relation to Egypt, for the River Nile, regarded as the life-blood of Egypt, flowed from her. When Egypt was firmly under the Ottoman Empire, great stress had been laid on ensuring that the Nile flowed without hindrance for the benefit of Egypt's agriculture. By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, Ottoman suzerainty over Egypt was beginning to flounder. Of the three countries which had by then emerged as the pre-eminent imperial powers of the epoch - Germany, France and Britain - Britain was particularly keen to have a foothold in Egypt in order to safeguard her trade route to India through the Suez Canal. Because Egypt depended on the Nile, the question of controlling its source became a matter of concern to the British, who feared that control might fall to a hostile power. Lugard, for example, argued at the time that 'whoever holds the Nile dominates Egypt' (The Times, 11 October 1892). Before long, however, Uganda came to be seen by many of those who had close knowledge of her to be perhaps even more important than Egypt. This was argued, for example, by Bishop Tucker, the leading Anglican missionary in Uganda (StJames' Gazette, 24 May 1893: F02/571). Towards the end of the nineteenth century it became a matter of debate whether to retain or abandon Uganda. In the event, Uganda was retained within the British sphere of influence. It is to the histories of the Arab and European efforts to control Central and Eastern Africa that the establishment of the military in Uganda can be traced. In particular, it is in the light of the country's strategic significance that political developments and the evolution of the military should be interpreted.

military in Uganda originated in the second half of the nineteenth century, when concerted and prolonged penetration of the African interior was made by Arabs and Europeans from two main directions. While Arab involvement was from the north, European penetration came from the south-east. The Arab incursion, however, had little bearing on the development of the military in what is modem Uganda, except for the ivory and slave trade the Arabs conducted with trained soldiers which affected Acholiland in northern Uganda {Intelligence Reports lA and 14, June 1902: F02/804). Some of the soldiers later transferred their services to agents of the Egyptian Government. The Egyptian Government, in one of the last expansionist moves of the Ottoman Empire, was making strenuous attempts to annex the northern part of present-day Uganda; for this purpose, various European agents were employed. Sir Samuel Baker, for example, during his governorship established a military fort at Patiko, a former slave and ivory depot in Acholiland, and on 14 May 1872 hoisted the Ottoman flag in Bunyoro symbolically expressing his intention to secure 'formal possession of Unyoro in the name of the Khedive of Egypt' (Baker, 1874: 242). And General Gordon, who succeeded Baker as Governor of Sudan's Equatorial Province, deployed Egyptian troops on the frontier ofBuganda, where in 1876 he set up a military post in order to strengthen the Egyptian presence. Both were acting on behalf of the Khedive in the interests of England. However, it was not as a result of the activities of Baker and Gordon that the military was first established in Uganda. Rather, it was a consequence of the British response to the danger in which another Egyptian agent, Emin, was placed by the Mahdist insurrection in the Sudan. The Mahdist uprising was a radical movement in the Sudan led by a Dongo carpenter named Mohammed Ali. In 1883 he raised a revolt in the form of a jihad (holy war) against the European and Egyptian presence. This presence was represented in Equatorial Province by Emin, Gordon's successor as Governor of the Province. Emin had with him a force of Sudanese troops in the service of the Khedive. A number of these soldiers had been in combat in Mexico in the 1860s as part of a contingent sent  the Khedive to help the French subdue the Mexicans. The Mahdist insurrection went on for more than a decade. In the course of it Emin, together with about 4000 loyal Sudanese, was effectively isolated from the outside world Wadelai, in present-day West Nile District, in north-western Uganda. When Khartoum fell to the Mahdists on 26 January 1885, General Gordon was murdered, and shortly afterwards the Egyptians evacuated the Equatorial Province, leaving Emin stranded. In the face of the rebellion, various groups were formed in Europe with a view to rescuing Emin. One such group was the Emin Relief Expedition, whose Chairman, William Mackinnon, at the same time began to plan the founding of a trading company under the title of the Imperial British East Mrica Company. It was hoped that, in return for being rescued, Emin would act as the Company's agent in the formation of trading stations and fortified posts, the opening up of trade routes and the establishment of a regular caravan and trade service. Emin's first-hand experience of the interior was considered crucial to the realisation of the scheme. He was required to agree to terms which allowed for a substantial number of troops which could be used to carry ivory to the east coast, and also to plunder ivory directly, thus ensuring a virtual monopoly of the ivory trade for the IBEA Co. In this way, military means were to be employed to promote the Company's economic ends. In the event, when the Mahdi revolt had been ended in 1889, Emin himself left with Stanley for the East Mrican coast. The other signatory to the agreement signed on 13 September 1891 by Captain Lugard on behalf of the Company was Selim Bay, as the representative of the Pasha's Sudanese troops. By this agreement almost a thousand troops formerly under Emin were transferred to the service of the IBEA Co. in Uganda. Thus the Company was to have control over what was in effect a standing army. It was from these trained Sudanese soldiers, together with his own armed followers and some of the askari (locally recruited guards) of the IBEA Co.'s private army that in 1891 Captain Lugard put together the military force which later formed the core of the Uganda Rifles. Lugard considered the Sudanese soldiers to be 'the best material for soldiery in Mrica' and he expected, by taking them over from Emin, to be able to hold both Buganda and Bunyoro, at the same time keeping the Company's costs down (Lugard, 1893 II: 134). In 1891, to underscore the function of the military to ensure security for the ivory trade, Captain Lugard placed some Sudanese troops along the trade routes in a line of forts running from Lake Edward to Lake Albert and then eastwards. He then returned to his base at Mengo, one of the hills of Kampala, with the other troops totalling about 800 men. These troops were used to help maintain order in Buganda, which was at that time with the other troops totalling about 800 men. These troops were used to help maintain order in Buganda, which was at that time in a state of disturbance owing to strife between religious factions. Lugard's action in employing troops to patrol trade routes was a reflection both of the responsibility with which he was entrusted as the agent of a commercial company, and of his belief in the importance of commerce for Britain: advantage may run parallel with duty ... I hold that our right is the necessity that is upon us to provide for our ever-growing population - either by opening new fields for emigration, or by providing work and employment which the development of overseas extension entails -and to stimulate trade by finding new markets, since we know what misery trade depression brings at home. (Lugard, 1893 II: 382) Although Lugard himself was not afforded enough time to put it into practice in Uganda, this belief in a dual mandate-of duty to the native population and advantage for Britain - lay at the heart of British colonial policy in Uganda, as elsewhere in Africa. The IBEA Co. evacuated Uganda on 31 March 1893, the term of their charter having expired, and on I April the British Government provisionally assumed responsibility for the country. The question of whether the British Government or the IBEA Co. should have responsibility over Uganda had been hotly debated in the British newspapers and among the public during the previous year. On the one hand there were those who were opposed to the Company continuing to operate in Uganda because they were sceptical about 'the civilising methods of the Imperial Company' (Daily Chronicle, II April 1893). The opponents of the IBEA Co. were particularly appalled by reports of its ill-treatment of the native peoples. It was even asserted in Parliament by Lord Herres, a leading figure in this group, that the honour of England was at stake (The Times, 14 June 1892). On the other hand there were those who took the view that Uganda should be retained by reason of her strategic and economic potential. Among those of this persuasion was Lugard, who pointed out the economic resources of the country: ivory, coffee, rubber, wheat and other cereals, cotton and gums (The Times, 7 November 1892). Some of those who shared his view did not question the Company's mistreatment of the natives, but suggested that the Company should be given direct financial and political support as a reward for the hardships undergone. The interests of the Company at that time were seen as virtually synonymous with  interests of Britain, and this was a strong argument in favour of retaining Uganda. It was this group that won the day.

 In 1893 the first enlistment of Sudanese under the British flag was made by Captain Roddy Owen. These troops numbered at least 450. Other Sudanese were recruited by Colonel Colvile, the Acting Commissioner. Some of these troops were stationed at Port Alice and Lubwa's (now Entebbe and Jinja respectively). A separate force was enlisted to make war on Omukama Kabarega of Bunyoro. The reasons for taking military action against Kabarega were threefold. First, Colvile had come to the conclusion that Kabarega was a stubborn enemy who was bent on frustrating British interests. Secondly, Kabarega's resurgent power was perceived both by the Baganda and by their British allies to be a threat against Buganda which was at the time a stronghold of British interests. Thirdly, Col vile wanted to open up a route from Buganda through Bunyoro to the Congo and the Sudan; but that would be difficult without the cooperation of Kabarega. For these three reasons, and also in order to expand the sphere of British interests, it was decided to invade Bunyoro. In December 1893 Colonel Colvile, who had only recently taken command of the embryonic Protectorate Army, declared war against Kabarega and his people, the Banyoro. Col vile co-opted the Baganda forces for his attack on the Banyoro. Later he was often criticised for this, on the grounds that the Kabaka was an unwilling collaborator, but Colvile firmly maintained that the Kabaka had raised no objections (Colvile, 1895: 74). However, the manner in which the war was declared and, indeed, the conduct of subsequent punitive expeditions, have suggested to some that 'the prime practical issue in the establishment of the Protectorate was not, as the British too readily assumed, one of law and right, but one of force and power' (Low, 1965: 59). For this expedition they used six Sudanese companies and a large army of Baganda. The number given by Colvile was 16 135 (letter to Consul-General, 2 January 1894: F02/71). This he later described as 'practically ... the whole able-bodied male population of Uganda [that is, Buganda], only old men, boys, and women being left behind' (Colvile, 1895: 100). This appears to be the first occasion on which a local force was used by the British in Uganda. It was, however, an ad hoc arrangement; these Baganda were not incorporated into the standing army. The Sudanese troops, on the other hand, became the backbone of the Army in Uganda, an army which began to be used in military campaigns to subdue resistance from indigenous peoples, as on this occasion. In several ways, then, the expeditions against the Banyoro set precedents for the establishment of colonial rule.

For his part, Kabarega raised a large force which was able to engage the British-led troops from December 1893 to February 1894. That it was possible for a substantial proportion ofthe population of Bunyoro to engage in these hostilities may be attributed to two factors: first, the nature of social relations in Bunyoro; although Bunyoro was less highly organised than, for example, Buganda, there was a well-integrated network of relationships and communication that allowed for large-scale organisation. Secondly, Kabarega and his chiefs had a strong political commitment to their independence and to resisting foreign domination, whether by the British or the Baganda, and they made tremendous efforts to mobilise their people. But by February 1894 Bunyoro had lost the battle against the British; although Kabarega was left at large, his position was precarious. For the next four years, however, he carried on his opposition to the British in protracted guerrilla warfare. The defeat of Kabarega's forces was a great loss for the Banyoro. Many of the Baganda and Sudanese allies of the British, on the other hand, were handsomely recompensed and were able to enrich themselves as a result ofthe assistance they had given to the administration (Intelligence Report 4, July-August 1901: F02/804). Medals were minted for the soldiers who had fought on the British side and for the Baganda chiefs who had supported the British cause. But of more serious impact was the award of land to the Baganda. Almost a quarter of the territory of Bunyoro (an area later known as the 'Lost Counties') was given away to Buganda by Colvile on behalf of the British administration and annexed to Buganda. This act was a political gesture - a reward to the Baganda for their services and a punishment to the Banyoro for their resistance. However, it was also of advantage to the colonial authorities, since the area in question was of strategic significance. From their point of view it was preferable that it should be under the control of a people who might be expected to be loyal to the administration. The action sowed seeds of bitterness among the Banyoro which lasted until part ofthe land was returned, after a referendum, on 1 January 1965 (see chapter 5). While the campaign against Kabarega was still in progress, in January 1894 Colonel Col vile despatched Major Owen to the north of Bunyoro to sign treaties with local rulers in that area. In his instructions to Owen Colvile stated that it would be necessary to establish a fort to make the treaties effective (Colvile Owen, 19 January 1894: F02/71 ). His words throw light on how colonial rule was established  in some parts of the country: the necessity of a military presence to enforce the treaties concluded between colonial officers and local rulers suggests that they were not contracted on a free or equal basis. Often local chiefs were required to sign treaties of whose substance they had little or no understanding (Thruston, 1900: 170-1). The significance of the military in the evolution of colonial rule was brought most dramatically to the fore in the war against Kabarega, which made a considerable impact on military policy in Uganda. A British Protectorate was formally proclaimed over Uganda on 19 June 1894, and Colonel Colvile then took the initiative in designing a long-term policy for the military in the Protectorate, which he subsequently proposed in a despatch to the Colonial Office (4 December 1894: F02/176). The recommendations he made for the establishment of the Uganda Rifles, which were modelled on the Constabulary Ordinance enacted for the Gold Coast (1879) and the Niger Coast (1894), were enthusiastically received by the Colonial and War Offices in London. In September 1895 the Uganda Rifles Ordinance was approved by Parliament (Uganda Rifles Ordinance: F02/176). Despite the name Uganda Rifles, troops were required by the Declaration by Oath on Enlistment (Clause 13) to swear allegiance directly to the British Sovereign and only by extension to the Protectorate Government. The Ordinance included a provision (Clause 58) for military action to be taken by the Uganda Rifles, not only against outside powers, but also against any local group within the Protectorate which engaged in active opposition to the administration. It appears that this provision of the Ordinance was in direct response to the recent events in Bunyoro. The de facto use of force by the Protectorate Government in that instance was legitimised by this Ordinance, and the legal instrument now existed to support a military response to local opposition in the future. Later in 1895 the existing forces in the Protectorate were absorbed into the newlyestablished Uganda Rifles. This army was composed principally of Sudanese troops commanded by British officers. The Uganda Rifles forces were to be the instrument of pacifying the country and establishing law and order, as seen by the British. Of such great importance were these forces to the administration of the Protectorate that the home government decided to send to Uganda one of the most outstanding officers in the British Army to ensure that the tasks of the new forces were carried out efficiently. The man chosen for this purpose was Major (later Brigadier-General) Ternan who had distinguished himself in service in Egypt. He arrived in Uganda late in 1895 and in the following year was appointed Commandant of the Uganda Rifles. On assuming responsibility over the Army, Ternan made some major changes in the disposition of his troops (Ternan, 1930: 255-66). The most significant of these changes was the concentration of military installations in politically sensitive areas rather than along trade routes. Busoga, for example, which lay on the trade route to the east coast, was left with only half a company, whereas almost half of the total strength of the army was assigned to Bunyoro (see Table 2.1). The new disposition of garrisons underpinned a fundamental change in the function of the military and the preoccupations of the administration. The departure of the IBEA Co. ended an era in which commerce had been the primary concern; when the British Government took over jurisdiction of the territory, the administration assumed a more strongly political tone. The year 1897 was a difficult one for the Protectorate Government. In Buganda, Kabaka Mwanga made a desperate attempt to drive out the British from his kingdom. He engaged the administration's forces at Buddu, some 20 miles from Kampala, where he was defeated but not captured. In Bunyoro, Omukama Kabarega, after years of waging guerrilla warfare against the colonial authorities, emerged to mount an open military challenge. The administration responded in kind and the two sides engaged in a conflict which lasted for several months, culminating in the defeat of Kabarega in August 1897. Despite the previous co-operation of some Baganda with the administration against the Banyoro, early in 1898 Kabaka Mwanga, already a fugitive from the British, joined up in Lango with his longstanding rival, Omukama Kabarega of Bunyoro, who was himself trying to evade capture by the authorities. However, in Aprill899 both rulers were apprehended and sent into exile. Soon afterwards both were replaced with people whom the Protectorate thought would be more co-operative. Proclaimed by Major Ternan as Kabaka Mwanga's successor was his infant son, Daudi Chwa, who was at the time only one year old. Although he was formally recognised as the new Kabaka, the effective administration of the kingdom was to be carried out by three Regents -Apollo Kagwa, Stanlias Mugwanya and Zakaria Kizito - during Chwa's minority. Omukama Kabarega was succeeded by one of his sons, Yosiya Kitehimbwa; but when he proved to be of a rather independent character, he was deposed in Duhaga (Intelligence Report 20, May-June 1903: F02/804).

In the same year, 1897, the Acting Commissioner, Wilson, raised a force of 10 000 Baganda troops to back up the Uganda Rifles. The force was placed under the temporary command of Lieutenant Grant, who used it in subduing Ankole; the same force was subsequently used in Busoga. As a matter of general policy, the administration intended the use of military force to convince those who resisted the establishment of colonial rule that their action was futile and to compel them to 'think it desirable to get on friendly terms with the Administration' (Ternan to Salisbury, 23 June 1897: F02/133). The incident which posed the most serious threat to the establishment of Protectorate rule was the Sudanese mutiny of 1897. The main cause of the mutiny was that some of the Sudanese troops, who had been engaged in numerous expeditions all over East Mrica with hardly any rest, felt-not without reason - that the administration did not sufficiently appreciate nor reward their services. For a long time they had been overworked, underand, often, unpaid, and not very understandingly handled. But perhaps more significant was the fact that the Sudanese had come to realise that the British owed their domination of the country to them, yet treated them appallingly. It was the troops' awareness of the part they played in the political development of the country, exacerbated by poor conditions of service, that emboldened them to think that since they were the only troops in the country, they would encounter little or no opposition if they revolted. The mutiny began in mid-September 1897 when, after a long march to and from Eldama Ravine in Kenya, a company of Sudanese troops refused to join an expedition to Central Sudan under Major Macdonald who was then serving in Uganda (Austin, 1903: 34-114). The British Government had ordered this expedition to forestall a French military advance on Fashoda on the White Nile which was rumoured to be imminent. The rebellion of the Sudanese troops took a dramatic tum, when late that year, a company at Lubwa's murdered their commander, Major Thruston, and five other European officers. Before long a substantial portion of the army at Lubwa's was in revolt and the mutiny was quelled only after seven months with the help of troops enlisted from India, Kenya (Swahili), Somaliland and elsewhere. The Imperial Government had called for Indian troops to be despatched to Uganda because of their excellent record in putting down uprisings in other countries, including Abyssinia, Egypt and Sudan. Another reason was the Indian troops' foreign origin: 

The idea in the first instance of maintaining an Indian Contingent in Uganda was the object of having a strong central body of troops, unconnected with any local tribes, or with the Sudanese, and who also from their position in the Kingdom of Uganda could check any tendency to insubordination among the outlying provinces of the Protectorate. (Report by Commissioner and Officer Commanding Troops, Uganda, to Landowne, 8 June 1903: F02/797.) The Indian Government responded to the request by sending 220 Sikhs and 200 Muslims, together with six European officers. The bringing of Indian troops to Uganda in 1897-8 was the first time Indians came to the country in substantial numbers. Considerable losses were sustained by both sides in the course of the mutiny. 

Immediately after the mutiny, soldiers' pay was increased from Rs 4 (in trade goods) toRs 20. However, 12 of the mutineers were hanged and an estimated 400-500 Sudanese lost their lives in the course of the mutiny. The mutiny ended the confidence of the Protectorate Government in the loyalty of the Sudanese troops on whom they had until then depended for the running of the country. Added to this was the fear that, since they had been in the country for a long time, the Sudanese might begin to identify their interests with those of the local people. As far back as 1893 military officers had expressed the fear that the Sudanese Muslims would join forces with local Muslims in a show of religious solidarity (Macdonald to Portal, June and July 1893: F02/60 and 61). After the mutiny colonial officials in the Protectorate began to draw parallels between Uganda and Ireland as countries in which religion would always play an important part in politics. The view was even voiced that: 'It is impossible to view the military situation in Uganda without taking the religious question into consideration' (Intelligence Report 5, September-October 1902: F02/804; compare Austin, 1903: 52). The religious issue in relation to the military during this period in particular, and in the general political development of Uganda, has been treated by other writers (Ashe, 1894; compare Ashe, 1889; Tucker, 1908; Gale, 1959; Low, 1971: 1-83). The principle of involving Indian and other foreign troops in suppressing the mutiny was predicated on the belief that they would act more efficiently than locally recruited forces. The Sudanese revolt not only led to an increase in the number of foreign troops brought into the country but also led to the more widespread adoption of a threefold principle in deploying Protectorate troops: a soldier should be of a different race, a different (and distant) geographical origin, and a different religious faith from the population in the area of posting. The underlying rationale was that the army would be more effective if the troops did not feel a sense of identity with the local population but owed allegiance only to the administration. Accordingly, it was suggested by a Protectorate official that the existing garrisons of Sudanese and Swahili troops which had been left by Lugard should be withdrawn from their stations in Buganda and be replaced by men who were unacquainted with the country and its inhabitants (Cave to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 6 December 1897). It is perhaps not self-evident that the principle would necessarily be effective. It might, for instance, be argued that the long deployment of essentially mercenary and predatory troops among native peoples would alienate the local population and thus create more unrest. On the other hand, soldiers who were unacquainted with the inhabitants and the environment in a new posting might be more cautious in their dealings. Perhaps the period of deployment was a more critical factor: it is likely that troops stationed in one place for a long time would build social bonds with the local community - through marriage, for example. Whatever its effectiveness, at any rate the threefold colonial principle of deploying troops was adopted at this time in the Protectorate.

The principle was not an innovation. It was already in operation in other areas of British dominion, notably in India where many of the officers in the Uganda Army had previously served (Lugard and Ternan, for example). In India, the principle was evolved in response to the 1857 mutiny. In Uganda it had been implicit from the start in the composition of the Army, with troops being drawn largely from the Sudan. In this matter the view of Lugard, the man who brought Sudanese troops into the country, is instructive. He later wrote 'battalions or wings of battalions which have no affinities with the population of the region in which they are serving, and even the introduction of an alien battalion, may be a wise precaution' (Lugard, 1922: 577). 

In November 1897 Major Ternan proposed to the War Office that the military in Uganda should be diversified (Ternan, 30 November 1897: F02/143). By the end of this year most of the area which now constitutes Uganda had been subjugated by the British (Berkeley to Salisbury, 26 January 1897: F02/133), thereby considerably increasing the extent of the territory to be administered by the Protectorate Government. The area within the Protectorate now included on the northern flank, Acholi; ori the eastern frontier, Mumia's in Kavirondo and Eldama Ravine (now in Kenya); and on the south-western tip, Ankole. Ternan, under whose command the Army was used for the most part to extend the Protectorate, described the Protectorate as being as big as France (Ternan, 1930: 25). Such a large area could not be administered without the backing of military force, and the army therefore had to be expanded. Ternan proposed that the Indian and Swahili troops, who had recently entered the country but had previously only been on loan to the Protectorate, should be officially incorporated into the Ugandan Army in order to meet the needs both of diversification and of expansion. The substance of Ternan's proposals became law in the following year when the 1895 Uganda Rifles Ordinance was repealed and replaced by the Uganda Military Force Ordinance of 1898 (F02/176). With the size of the army increased in this way, military stations could now be established in most parts of the country, paving the way for a new administrative structure in the Protectorate. The most economical approach to the problem of administering the Protectorate was to merge the military and the civil administration. In the middle of 1897 Commissioner Berkeley had made it known that the large increase in military staff would facilitate a 'closer and more extended association between civil and military authorities throughout the Protectorate' (Kampala: Circular of 5 July 1898: F02/259). Indeed, all over Africa at the time, it was difficult to draw a sharp distinction between civil and military administration. In accordance with Berkeley's proposal, towards the end of the year Uganda was divided for administrative purposes into four military districts: Eastern; Northern (including the Nile sub-province); Buganda (all of southern Uganda); and Bunyoro (the whole of western Uganda). By the end of the century, the integration of military and political structures in the Protectorate was complete. The arrangement had the advantage of keeping down administrative costs: it was unnecessary during this period to recruit officers from the metropolitan country for the sole purpose of civil administration, since military officers served in a dual capacity. Military rule was thought to be the only way of creating and enforcing authority and order over people among whom familiarity with the British seemed to have bred contempt (Manning, memo, 7 September 1903: F02/797). However, the arrangement was a transitional one. During the period of the military administration, 1897-9, mopping-up operations were conducted by the colonial army in Uganda to stamp out the last pockets of resistance. They were largely successful and the path was cleared for the establishment of a civil administration. In 1899 Sir Harry Johnston was sent by the Imperial Government as Commissioner specially appointed to work out a comprehensive political arrangement with the indigenous rulers. The British Government's intention was to formalise and consolidate the gains of almost a decade of rule over the Protectorate. In March 1900 Johnston concluded an agreement with the Baganda Regents. Known as the 1900 Uganda Agreement, it marked a critical point in the relationship between the British and their subjects in Uganda, and inaugurated a new era in the administration of the country (Johnston, 1902 I). The Agreement set out the principles of administration for the country and defined Buganda's position vis-a-vis the rest ofUganda. In the military field specifically, the Agreement made it illegal for the Kabaka to raise an army without prior consultation with the Imperial Government's representative in the Protectorate. Sir Harry Johnston believed that from now on it would be unnecessary to depend heavily on the military for the civil administration of the country. In his view, what the Protectorate needed was a constabulary which could assist the civil authority. This would leave  the Army to be called upon to intervene only in special cases of disturbance. The British signed the first of their agreements with the peoples of Uganda with the Baganda Regents because it was with the Baganda, of all the ethnic groups in the region, that they had had the closest contact; indeed their dealings with the indigenous people were for long almost entirely restricted to them. As co-signatories of the Treaty, the Baganda were more irrevocably committed to its terms than were the inhabitants of any other part of Uganda. The Agreement ensured for them a privileged status vis-a-vis the rest ofUganda, thereby regula rising and fostering inequalities between Buganda and the other provinces of the country. The Agreement was signed, not by the traditional authority, the Kabaka - who was only an infant -but by the Regents and chiefs. The concluding of the 1900 Uganda Agreement marks the end of the early phase of colonial rule in Uganda and the beginning of a new era in the political development of the country. In the coming years the Protectorate Administration signed agreements - modelled on, but less favourable than, the Uganda Agreement-with the other kingdoms: Toro on 29 June 1900; Ankole on 7 August 1901; and Bunyoro on 23 October 1933. The changing political climate was reflected in the composition and deployment of the Uganda Army.